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one, in which relief is granted to executors, on the ground of mistake ; or, the case mentioned in section ninety-nine of the destruction
of a will by the testator, under the supposition that a later will
had been well executed, which is a case of mistake.
G. H. S.

Ia the Supreme Court of Iowa, December, 1859.
Scott District Court.

Appeal from

STOKES ET AL. VS. THE COUNTY OF SCOTT.'
1. County bonds: railroads.

The counties of this State have no power to borrow

money or subscribe stock to aid in the construction of railroads; and the issuing
of bonds by the counties, or the transfer of them by the corporations to whom
they are issued, may be restrained by injunction-WooDwARD, J., dissenting.
2. The power and liabilities of counties relating to bonds issued for such purposes fully considered and discussed; and The Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
Co. vs. Dubuque County, 4 G. Greene, 1, overruled; The State vs. Bissell, lb.
328; Clapp vs. The County of Cedar, 5 Iowa, 15; .APtillanet al. vs. Lee County and
.Boyles County ludge, 3 1b. 311; and Ring vs. The County ofJ-ohnson, 6 Ib.

265,

reviewed;
WRIGHT, C. J., holds that the counties have no power to issue bonds for such
purposes, and that they are absolutely void, whether in the hands of the county
proposing to issue, of the corporation to whom it is proposed to issue them, or of
third persons;
STOCKTON, J., concurs in the original proposition, as to the power of the counties, and that the issuing of the bonds, or the transfer of the same by the corpcrations to whom they are issued, should be enjoined, but holding that bonds in
the hands of bona fide holders should be treated as valid; and
WOODWARD, J., dissents from the judgment of the Court, holding.that the power
of the counties to issue such bonds should be regarded as settled by the abovenamed authorities.

On the 24th of December, 1858, the electors of the county of
Scott, by a majority vote, authorized the county judge to subscribe
275,000 to the capital stock of the Davenport and Cedar Valley
Railroad Company, and $100,000 to that of the Le Claire and
Davenport Railroad Company. By this vote he was also authorized
to levy a tax to pay the principal and interest of the bonds, not to
I This

case will be found in 2 Withrow's Rep. 166, and we are indebted to the

learned Reporter for it.-Bd. Am. L. Reg.
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exceed one per cent. in each case in any one year. On the 27th of
the same month, these petitioners filed their petition for an injunction to restrain the county judge from subscribing the stock and
issuing the bonds. The injunction was granted, but subsequently,
on respondent's motion, was dissolved and the bill dismissed. Complainant's appeal.
James Grant,for the appellant, reviewed Clapp vs. Cedar County,
5 Iowa, 15; Ring vs. Johnson County, 6 lb. 265 ; .M'41illanvs.
Lee County and Boyles County Judge, Ib.304; contending that
in those cases the question of the power of a county to issue bonds
was incumbered with the question of vested rights, which does not
enter into this case. He also cited and relied upon the Commonwealth ex el. Thomas vs. Te County of Allegheny, 7 Am. Law
Reg. 90; and M'Coy vs. Washington County, Ib.193.
C. -. Putnam and George E. Hubbell, for the appellee.
Have counties in the State of Iowa the constitutional power to
subscribe aid for the construction of railroads in the counties ?
I. The constitution neither expressly nor by implication, directly
nor indirectly, forbids the exercise of this power, and the first clause
of section 2, article 1, declares that "all political power is inherent
in the people."
II. There being no constitutional prohibition, the Legislature has
by law authorized the county judge to submit to the people, at any
regular or special election, the question whether money may be
borrowed to aid in the construction of any road or bridge: Code of
1851, section 114.
III. Is this law constitutional? The Supreme Court of this
State has in the following cases recognized its constitutionality, and
the power of the counties to issue bonds to aid in the construction
of railroads: -Dubuqueand.PacificRailroad Company vs. Dubuque
County, 4 G. Greene, 1 ; The State vs. Bissell, Ib.328; Clapp vs.
Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15 ; Ring vs. Johnson County, 6 Ib.265;
M'Xillan et al. vs. Lee County and Boyles County Judge, Ib.391.
C.J.-Several objections are made by the bill, and in
the argument in this Court to the proceedings submitting these proWRIGHT,
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positions to the people. The first in order is that which denies the
right or power of the counties in this State to borrow money or subscribe to the stock of any company for the purpose in this vote contemplated. And this position I proceed to examine.
A brief recapitulation of the cases in which this question has been
presented in this State may not be inappropriate. It first arose
before our predecessors in Dubuque County vs. The Dubuque and
Pacific Railroad Company, 4 G. Greene, 1, in which a majority of
the court (KINNEY, J., dissenting) affirmed the power of the Legislature to authorize such a subscription, and that it had been given
by section 114 of the Code.
In a subsequent case, The State vs. Bissell, 4 G. Greene, 328,
HALL, J., in speaking of this point, says, it "was not urged, and
the same question having been decided at the December term, 1858,
of this court [referring to the case supra] is not examined. This
decision is not intended to sanction or deny the legal validity of
that decision, but to leave the question where that has left it."
The question was first presented to the court as now constituted
in M'Millan et al. vs. Lee County and Boyles County Judge, 3
Iowa, 311, but was not then decided, as the case was disposed of
upon other and different grounds.
It was first decided by us in Clapp vs. The County of Cedar, 5
Iowa, 15. In that case, the bonds had been issued and passed into
the hands of an innocent holder. A majority of the court held,
under the authority of the previous decisions, that the power could
be and had been conferred. It will be seen, however, by reference
to page 45 of that case, that the decision was based alone upon the
ground that the majority felt bound by former decisions, and for
the reason that it was a subject on which change was disastrous, for,
says WOODWARD, J., " if we were called upon to decide this question now for the first time, for this State, we should entertain heavy
doubts of the existence of the power on any ground; and if the
attempt were made to place it upon section 114 of the Code, under
the power to aid in constructing roads, we should think very lightly
of the argument. If the power exists, it must have some other
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foundation. But this is a subject on which change is disastrous," &c.
In Ring vs: Johnson County, 6 Iowa, 265, the action was upon
the coupons which had passed into the hands of an innocent holder,
and the question now under consideration was not argued. The
case in 5 Iowa, 15, is referred to, however, very briefly, it being
stated that "the court has seen no occasion for a change of view."
In the case of 71PMillanet al. vs. Boyles, County Judge, 6 Iowa,
304 and 391, the bonds were issued, tax levied to meet the interest,
and the petitioners sought to restrain the county officers from collecting the same. This court had held the vote to be irregular, 8
Iowa, 311; and the Legislature, by an act of 29th of January, 1857,
legalized the issuing of said bonds, and declared said vote to be regular, valid, and legal. The power of the county to take stock is recognized by reference to the cases previously adjudicated, and the case
turned upon the question of the power of the Legislature to legalize
the irregularity,in the manner of submitting the proposition. The
power was held to exist, and the order of the court below dissolving
the injunction was affirmed.
In the three cases of Garnes, Alger & Junkin vs. Robb, (June
term, 1859,) the county treasurer had levied upon personal property
to satisfy a tax thus voted. The owners brought trespass and replevin, and, among other grounds, urged that the county had no power
to levy and collect a tax for this purpose. The question was regarded
as settled by the previous cases, and was disposed of by simply
referring to them.
In the case before us, the question is made for the first time to
the present members of the court, before the bonds have been issued
and before the rights of third parties have intervened.
By reference to the cases cited it will be observed that I have
uniformly denied the power, and have held as a consequence that
the bonds were invalid, that the tax could not be collected, and that
the vote afforded no protection to revenue officers in levying upon
property to make the same. My dissent is expressed in Clapp vs.
The County of Cedar, Ring vs. Johnson County, M1'Millan vs.
Lee County and Boyles County Judge; and though not expressed
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in Garnes et at. vs. Robb, it was because the previous decisions were
stated without argument, and they showed my position so clearly,
that a formal dissent seemed unnecessary. In .M'Millanvs. Boyles
(ounty Judge, I concurred in the opinion that the Legislature had
the power to legalize the irregularity, but denied the power of the
county, though expressly authorized, to subscribe the stock.
These references give us the history of this question in this State,
to the present date. As a majority of the court have concluded in
this case, where the question is made before the bonds have been
issued, that the injunction prayed for should have been made
perpetual, I proceed to state briefly the grounds upon which this
opinion, so far as I am concerned, is founded.
For myself, as will be seen from what has been stated, I regard
that it makes no difference whether the objection is made in a suit
on the bonds, or in a proceeding by injunction to restrain the subscription to the stock. In my opinion, the county has no power,
inherently or otherwise, to issue bonds and subscribe stock for any
such purpose, and putting it upon this plain, broad ground, I deny
that such bonds are valid, whether held by the railroad company or
by an indorsee. There are, it is claimed, fair arguments and some
authorities for holding that the bonds will not be declared invalid,
though the county might and could be restrained by the courts, if
applied to, from issuing the same. This view of the case, however,
I do not propose to examine, as it will be discussed by my brother
STOCKTON, who concurs with me in reversing the case, upon the

ground that the objection is made before the stock has been subscribed or the bonds issued.
I deny that under the constitution (old or new) tte Legislature
can confer this power upon the counties. I deny, in the second
place, that a majority have any inherent right to vote such a tax,
so as to subject the property of the minority to seizure and sale for
the purpose of paying the same. And, in the third place, I affirm
that the Legislature never has conferred this power upon the counties.
Th'e argument is not strongly urged in favor of the inherent right
to vote this tax, and I may therefore dispose of it in a few words.
Taxation is an element of sovereignty. Safety to the dearest rights
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of the citizen demands that this should be so, and that it should not
be exercised, except where it is necessary for the welfare or safety
of the public. All ordinary taxation, whether national, State, or
county, is based upon this ground. The citizen pays these taxes in
return for the protection and security which is guaranteed and
secured to him by law, and the political and municipal organizations
created for the like purpose. To support these governments and
those institutions, which are essential to their well being and vital
to their continuance, he is subject to taxation. For a purpose, such
as that embraced in the proposition submitted in this instance, he is
not bound. However much such enterprises may tend to develop
the material resources of the country, they can in no proper sense
be said to render more secure his person, his life, or his liberty, nor
to place his property under more perfect protection. It is true that
intelligence and knowledge may be more generally diffused, as a
consequence of the increase of railroad facilities. And the same is
true where mills, manufactories, and machinery are introduced, and'
yet it would scarcely be claimed that a county has the inherent right,
in its corporate capacity, to tax the people for any such purpose.
The argument that a majority must rule under our form of government, and that each citizen, as a member of society, must submit to
this rule, as applied to such questions, is no less dangerous than fallacious. Carried out, popular will, when thus exercised, could
legalize the execution of the citizen; could take A's property and
give it to B. These propositions would be regarded as monstrous.
And yet how is it different when the majority attempt to tax the
minority, without the authority of legislative sanction, for a purpose
entirely foreign to the support of government ? I see no difference
in principle, and there is none certainly when viewed in reference
to those fundamental rights which are secured to us by the natural
law, and which no legislation can take from us.
Then, again, the counties exercise granted powers, and, as municipal organizations, cannot exercise any other. If not expressly
granted, yet if necessary to carry out or accomplish the purpose
and object of their creation, they may be exercised, but not otherwise. M'Millan vs. Lee County, 8 Iowa, 811. If the power
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claimed in this instance has not been granted, or is not necessary
for the fulfillment of the purposes designed in the creation of the
corporation, the conclusion follows that its exercise would be illegal
and nugatory.
But I pass from this part of the case to the consideration of the
first and third propositions before stated. For if the power can,
under the constitution, be conferred, and if the Legislature has, acting under the constitution, made the grant, then we need not stop
to view it as one of inherent right. And here again I may abbreviate this opinion by confining myself to the question, whether the
power has been conferred, for if not, the argument is at an end. It
is claimed to be given by section 114 of the Code. This view never
has been held by any member of this court; and with the utmost
respect for the learned judge delivering the opinion in the case of
Dubuque County vs. The Dzubuque and Pacific Railroad Go. 4
Greene, 1, where this proposition is maintained, I must say that it
is not sustained by the language of the law, and that it is-in the
very teeth of its spirit, as well as the notorious and well-understood
history of our legislation on this subject.
The language which it is claimed gives this power, is as follows:
"The county judge may submit to the people of his county, at any
regular election, or at a special one called for that purpose, the
question whether money may be borrowed to aid in the erection of
public buildings ; whether the county will construct or aid to construct any road or bridge which may call for an extraordinary
expenditure; whether stock shall be permitted to run at large or at
what time it shall be prohibited; and the question of any other local
or police regulation, not inconsistent with the laws of this State."
The question is, What "roads" are meant? Does the section
embrace railroads or only the ordinary highways or roads of the
county ?
It is said that it is not to be confined to the latter, because these
do not require such an extraordinary expenditure. The argument,
if true, proves too much. For if they did not require it then they
are not within the language used, and the provision only applies to
railroads, or roads of that character, as contradistinguished from
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the ordinary highways of the State. And yet no person will claim
this. But, then, why do not our common roads or highways, or why
may they not, require such an expenditure-an expenditure greater
than can be applied from the ordinary road revenue of the county ?
Isit improbable that in many portions of the State all of the ordinary revenue applicable to road purposes and all the work provided
by law would be insufficient to make some desired and necessary
common road passable, or in a proper condition for the trade and
travel of the county? It seems to me that it is plain to the apprehension of any person that such a case is not only possible but
probable. I could readily suppose instances, but their probable, not
to say, actual existence must be palpable to any man. Let me refer
to one item in our legislation, however, which affords demonstration
on this subject. We had swamp or over-flowed lands in this State
before, as well as after, the passage of this section, and before, as
well as after, the donation of these lands by Congress to the
several States. Roads had to be constructed over these lands for
the purpose of ordinary travel, as well as over other portions of the
State. Now, if our ordinary highways did not and do not in
fact require an extraordinary expenditure under any circumstances,
and if the revenue and labor devoted to road purposes are sufficient
for putting any and all of them in a proper condition, why should
the Legislature, by express enactment, devote a large portion of the
proceeds of these overflowed lands to the opening of the roads over
such lands, and at the same time give the roads their equal portion
of the ordinary revenue and work ? I repeat, therefore, that this
argument proves too much, and is not sustained by the actual position and condition of our highways either before, at the time, or
subsequent to the adoption of the Code.
But it is said that the word "any" "extends to an indefinite
number of roads." This may be true, and the inquiry would still
remain, Does it extend to an indefinite number in kind.P By no
means. But take the whole language, "any road or bridge which
azay call for an extraordinaryexpenditure," and parsing it, what
is its meaning ? Manifestly, the word "any" refers to such as may
require the expenditure named, and we still have to ascertain to
30
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what roads such expenditure may be applied. Not only so, but
"any," as here used, refers to the road-aroad, any instance, case,
or occasion, in any county, in any part of the State, where the
expenditure is regarded necessary.
But I am told that sections &67-9 of the Code provide an ample
fund for ordinary road purposes, and that this may be increased to
any extent by a vote of the people. In most cases it may be true
that the revenue provided for in these sections is sufficient. We
have already seen, however, that this is not true to the extent
claimed. But it is said that the amount may be increased by a
vote of the people. By what authority and in what manner, I ask ?
The answer is, By this very section 114, which we are now construing. And thus when it is said that the fund may be increased by
such a vote, what becomes of the argument that such an expenditure
was not contemplated as applying to our ordinary highways ?
Having thus noticed, perhaps at greater length than necessary,
the arguments urged against the construction for which I contend,
I proceed to state the grounds which I think are conclusive in its
favor.
And, first, the Code itself has given a definition of the word
"road," which, in my opinion, places the question beyond controversy. By section 26 we have a rule for the construction of the
statiites of this State; and, by the 5th clause, it provides that "the
words, highway, and 'road,' include public bridges, and may be
held equivalent to the words ' county way,' ' county road,' ' common road,' and 'State road.'" In the light of this language, what
becomes of the argument that the word "road" means railroad?
It is a truism, as stated in the case referred to in 4 G. Greene,
supra, that the great object in the construction of a statute is to
discover the true intention of the Legislature, and, in giving us the
meaning of the word "road," the Legislature has given an infallible
key to discover the intention in the present instance.
Then, again, the same case states that the words of the statute
are to have their natural and ordinary sense or meaning. Granted,
and what is proved? Just this, that the word "road," according to
Webster, applies generally to highways, and, as a generic term,
includes highway, street, and lane. Not only so, but at the time of
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the passage of the Code we had not a mile of railroad in the State,
and none commenced. Then, again, even now in this State, when
we have several lines of railway constructed, no person understands
the ordinary meaning of the word to include a railroad. What
charter incorporating a company for the purpose of constructing a
railway ever spoke of it as a road company? What articles of
incorporation ever called or styled the company thus ? What act
of the Legislature, giving lands, conferring privileges, or imposing
duties upon such a company, can be found, which designates it as a
road company ? I answer, none. The truth is, every person,
everywhere and under all circumstances, when designing to speak
with any degree of accuracy, in this State, at least, if they refer to
such a road, they use the prefix rail. In those States where the
most usual mode of conveyance and travel is by railway, in ordinary
conversation they may be spoken of as roads. But not so even in
such States when anything like legal accuracy or the legal sense
is aimed at. But in this State it is not true that the word road is
understood railroad, either in ordinary conversation, or when used
in the statute, for whatever purpose framed. And particularly was
this the case at the time of the adoption of the Code.
But this question has a legislative history, and if there was any
room for doubt whatever, that history shuts the door effectually.
When the Code was reported to the Legislature by the commissioners, section 114 contained the language immediately following
the words "any extraordinary expenditure," "whether the county
will subscribe to any work of internal improvement," and this
clause, after a struggle continuing through several days of the session, was stricken out. And why? Because the power was already
given by the use of the previous words, "any road or bridge?"
No one will claim so. Every.person looking into the journals of
the session, or in the least familiar with the history of that Legislature, knows it was because it was expressly intended to withhold the power to subscribe to works of internal improvement.
Again, by reference to the Journal of the House for 1852-3, (the
first session after the adoption of the Code,) it will be found that a
bill was introduced to amend this section; that this bill was referred
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to the judiciary committee, with instructions to report what portions
of it were then the law of this State ; that this committee subsequently reported that all of it was then the law except this clause:
"Or whether the county will take stock in any corporationfor internal improvement, either in or out of the State." It will also be
seen that a substitute was introduced for this bill, which conferred
the power in express terms, and that this was once passed, subsequently reconsidered, and defeated. I refer for the history of this
controversy to the Journal of the House of Representatives, pages
45, 52, 68, 74, 78, 81, 167, 170, 180, 208, 218. So that whether
we look to the construction placed upon this section by the Judiciary Committee, or to the subsequent persistent effort to confer
the power, and its defeat by the Legislature, there can be no doubt
as to the meaning or construction then given and placed upon this
section. And thus we find that the same General Assembly which
passed the Code expressly refused to confer the power, and the
subsequent one voted down a proposition to amend the section, so as
to make it read substantially as it did when reported by the commissioners.
In view of this history, I ask, Can anything be clearer than that
the Legislature never intended to confer the power claimed by the
appellee in this case? It seems to me not, and that whether we
look to the language of the law, the construction given to the words
used by the Code itself, to the natural and received sense of the
language employed, to the history of its passage, the subsequent
attempt to confer the power, or to all of them combined, the argument is abundant, convincing, overwhelming against the position
that the power claimed has been conferred.
Such being my construction of the law which it is insisted confers
this power, it becomes unnecessary to examine the question of the
Legislature to authorize taxation by the counties for such purposes.
Nor need I pass upon the other questions made by appellants, in
relation to the regularity of the vote in this instance. If there was
no power, the strictest compliance with the law as to the manner of
submitting the question cannot avail.
In my opinion, the cause should be reversed, and the injunction
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made perpetual. And this being the opinion of a majority of the
court, it is so ordered.
STOCKTON, J.-I concur in opinion with the Chief Justice
that there is no power in the counties of this State, under the provisions of the Code, sections 114, 116, to subscribe to the capital
stock of railroad companies, and issue county bonds in payment of
the same.
This is the first time, to the court as at present constituted, this
question has been made previous to the taking of the stock and the
issuing of the bonds. In the case of Clapp vs. The County of Cedar,
5 Iowa, 15, it was held by a majority of this court, in which ruling
I concurred, that the bonds of Cedar county, issued to the "Lyons
Central Ilailroad Company," in payment for stock in said company
subscribed by said county, were valid and binding, and the holders
thereof were entitled to recover the amount of the bonds from the
county.
A decision to the same effect was made in the case of Bing vs.
Johnson County, 6 Iowa, 265. These are the only cases before
this court of actions brought upon the bonds or coupons, in which
the validity of such bonds has been questioned ; and in each of these
cases, in my opinion, the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon
grounds entirely distinct from the question of the power in the
county to take the stock and issue the bonds.
Independent of the question, that the bonds had passed from the
possession and ownership of the railroad companies into the hands
of innocent purchasers, who had in good faith paid their money for
the same, which money had gone to the use of the counties, and
been expended by them, the General Assembly, by the acts of January 25, 1855, chapters 128 and 149, in effect legalized these
bonds, and made them valid and binding in.the hands of the holders
thereof. The case above named, therefore, did not necessarily
involve the question of the power of the counties to subscribe the
stock and issue the bonds, under the sections of the Code above
referred to.
In the case of 'Miflan vs. County Judge and Treasurerof Lee
County, 6 Iowa, 304 and 891, the question was upon the legality of
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the tax levied to pay the interest on bonds by the county of Lee in
payment of its subscription of stock in certain.railroads. The vote
taken by authority of the county judge, upon the question of taking
said stock, had been by this court decided to be illegal, null, and void:
3 Iowa, 311. The General Assembly had, however, by the act of
January 29, 1857, (Session Acts, p. 447,) not only legalized the vote
taken by the county judge, but had further declared the bonds issued
in pursuance of such vote legal and valid, and a valid lien upon the
taxable property of said county, and had required the county
judge to levy and collect a tax to meet the payment of the principal
and interest of said bonds. Under these circumstances, the only
question to be determined was, whether the Legislature had the
power to legalize the vote, and to declare the bonds valid and binding on the county.
As to the power in the Legislature, there has been at no time any
doubt in my mind. I think the power may by them be conferred
upon the counties to take the stock and issue the bonds without any
constitutional objection; and where it has been conferred, and the
bonds have been issued in conformity with it, or where the bonds,
though illegally or informally issued, have been subsequently
legalized by the Legislature, I think they are binding upon the
county, and must be paid.
In the case at present under consideration, the objection is taken,
in the first instance, to the power of the county to issue the bonds.
They are not yet issued; they have not passed into the hands of
the railroad company, nor of innocent purchasers for value.
The question is made, in my opinion, at the proper time to test
the power of the county to take stock and issue the bonds. It is
made at a time when it is unincumbered by any question of bona
fide holders, or of subsequent legalization of the bonds by the Legislature; and looking at the provisions of the Code under which the
power is attempted to be derived, and upon which it is placed by the
opinion of the Court in the case of Dubuque County vs. The
.Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, 4 G. Greene 1, I am
clearly of opinion that no such power was intended to be or has in
reality been conferred upon the counties.
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The question in this case is to be viewed simply in the light of
the power and authority conferred by the Legislature, or intended
so to be. Such being the case, I am constrained to dissent from the
ruling of this court in the above-entitled case, which, in my opinion,
is the only one in which the question has been authoritatively determined. There is a distinction to be observed between the question
of the power of the counties to issue the bonds, when made, as in
this case, in the first instance, and before their issue; and when
made in a suit brought upon the bonds to recover their amount from
the county by one to whom they have been transferred as an innocent purchaser. The courts, in my opinion, may well allow the
question, whether the power has been conferred by the Legislature
upon the counties to issue such bonds, to be made upon an application for an injunction to restrain their issue, when it would not be
allowed to be made when the- bonds had gone into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, after the county had received the
proceeds of the bonds, and after the money had been expended for
its use and benefit. The plainest rules of justice and equity would
seem to require, when such is .the case, that the county should not
be allowed to urge, as a defence in an action on the bonds, that
they had been issued without the authority of law. To say nothing
of public opinion, something is due to good faith and to the obligation recognized and resting upon all subordinate authorities, and
particularly upon those standing in so close a relation to the supreme
authority of the State, as do our county corporations, to maintain
the public credit.
In the attitude in which the question now presented stands, I am
of opinion that there is no power in the county to issue these bonds,
and that the injunction should be made perpetual.
The counsel for appellants refers to the following authorities in
support of the position assumed by him. We have not been able to
obtain the volume referred to, but we give the citation for the benefit of those who may be disposed to examine them: Com. vs. Com,missioners, &a., 7 Am. Law Reg. 92, and XcCoy vs. County of
Washington, 193 ; Knox Co. vs. Aspinwall, 21 Howard, U. S.
Rep. 539.
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WOODWARD, J., dissenting.-As I am unable to concur in the
conclusion to which the majority of the court has arrived, that the
injunction should have been allowed, it becomes me to state, briefly,
at least, the ground of my dissent.
In both of the cases, Clapp vs. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15, and
Ring vs. Johnson County, 6 Iowa, 265, the question of the power
of counties to subscribe to stock in railway companies, and to issue
their bonds therefor, was clearly made. In the first of these cases,
(page 45,) it is said, in the opinion of the court, that "on the first
step in the inquiry, that is, upon the inherent authority of a State
to enter into these and similar internal improvements, no one has
ventured to make a question. The second step would be, whether
a Legislature possesses the power to confer this authority upon a
county." This question is not discussed. The opinion proceeds :
"The next stage is this, Do the counties of this State possess this
authority, whether inherently or by express provisions ? If we
were called upon to decide the question now for the first time, for
this State, we should entertain heavy doubts of the existence of the
power, upon any grounds, and if the attempt were made to place it
upon section 114 of the Code, under the power to aid in constructing roads, we should think very lightly of the argument. If the
power exists it must have some other foundation. But this is a
subject on which change is disastrous. It is one on which we are
bound by former decisions. Such an one has been made, and the
public and the world have acted upon it." "It is impossible to
recede. The world waits and listens for the judicial determination,
and then acts accordingly, and in this case has acted with vigor."
The opinion then refers to the action of the Legislature recognizing
the exercise of this power by the counties. In the case against the
County of Johnson the court refer to the above, and forbear a discussion of the question.
It would not be possible for a judicial opinion to indicate more
clearly what would be the view of the Court, if it were untrammeled
by previous decisions and legislative action, and were free to express
its own opinion. So far as regards the existence of the power, true,
under the law as it now is, I agree with the Chief Justice, and have
so agreed from the time the first case was presented.
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But the decision of the above cases was placed upon the ground
that previous adjudication had declared, and repeated legislation had
recognized the existence of the power. Admitting the truth that
courts, as well as individuals, might differ in opinion, we conceive
that this was a subject on which the highest detriment might be
wrought, both to the people of the State at large, and to the individuals and bodies concerned, by a fluctuation of opinion in the courts;
and regarding the fact that companies and individuals had committed
themselves to a very great extent, putting faith in the previous
adjudications and legislation, we (the majority of the court) conceive ourselves bound by as high considerations as can well be
addressed to a court, to stand by past decisions. I feel myself
justified by these considerations, and still hold to them.
And this is the ground upon which the above decisions are placed,
and the only ground. No argument is drawn from the circumstance
that the bonds had been issued, or that they were in the hands of
bonafide purchasers. No argument, I mean, bearing on the greater
question of the power of the county, or of the validity of the bonds.
The bona fides of the holders' title has, it is true, some influence
upon the question of what defences may be made, but this is unimportant in connection with the present considerations.
The opinion of Justice STOCKTON, concurring with the Chief Justice in the position that the counties do not possess the power in
question, holds that the issuance of the bonds may be resisted and
prohibited when the application therefor is made before they have
been uttered. This opinion stands upon the want of authority, in
fact, in the county, and still recognizes the former decisions where
the bonds had been uttered and were in the hands of innocent
holders.
With this opinion I am not able to concur, because, if there is a
want of authority, I cannot distinguish between the cases where the
bonds have been and where they have not been issued. The lack
of authority to create them goes to the foundation of any considerations concerning them. If there is no power, the vote and the
bonds are equally void,-equally nullities. The vote, in such case,
has no virtue to support a bond which has gone out to a third per-
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son, any more than one which has not yet gone out. If the defect
were in some informality, or in some steps of the proceeding to
obtain a vote, it may well be regarded as cured when the obligation
has been sent out to the world. But a want of power to vote, of
authority to make obligation, is incurable, no matter when it is
shown, or in whose hands the bond may be. The bona fides of a
purchase and the innocency of a holder cannot create a power.
In respect to the case of Lee County, 6 Iowa, 304 and 391, I
have at all times regarded it as a case of legalizing the vote against
informalities, and not as touching thefundamental point of authority. The act there in question (Acts 1857, page 447) uses the
terms, "all votes in Lee and Davis counties, in the form of a joint
or several proposition, &c," and the county is forbidden to plead
that the bonds are "irregular or invalid in consequence of the
informalities caused by this Act." And, again, the bonds issued
were to be held valid, &c., "notwithstanding any informality or
irregularityin the submission of the question to the vote of the
people."
In my opinion, in the above case, 6 Iowa, 305-30, I say that "the
question now made is, whether the Legislature could cure the evils
existing in the former submission to any vote by the people of Lee
county." The question of power is passed by, and the opinion says:
"We understand this question to have been settled in the case of
Clapp vs. Cedar County." Then the opinion proceeds, "The power
having been conferred, can the General Assembly cure any defects
in the exercise of it .?" "If this exercise of authority were held to
be unconstitutional, then it would follow that the Legislature could
not render the case valid. But inasmuch as that body can confer
the authority, and has conferred it, we conceive that the same body
may remedy a defect in the exercise of it."
The opinion of the Chief Justice, in the same case, (6 Iowa, 393,)
views the question in the same light, that is, as one concerning the
power of the Legislature to cure a defect or remedy an irregularity.
If the fact that the bonds have been issued and sold, and have
gone into the hands of innocent purchasers whose money has gone
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to the county and been expended for its benefit, has weight, and
may be urged on the one side, then it would seem that, on the
other, the contrary might be shown, namely, that the money had
not been so used in those cases where the road has not been built.
Where it has been so applied, it is true that justice and equity would
forbid the county pleading a want of authority; but this is in the
moral sense, and it does not follow that the law will forbid it, for however bad the morals in pleading it, the bonds are nevertheless absolutely void. In conclusion, I am not able to concur in saying, that
because the objection is made in limine, or before the bonds are
issued, therefore there is no authority in the county to utter them;
whilst after they have gone forth, that power exists. They rest on
the same vote in both cases.
The weight of the argument, drawn from former decisions and
legislation, presented in the case against Cedar county, has been
inconceivably strengthened by that any the subsequent cases, and I
regard it as my duty in this more than any other case that has ever
come before me stare decisis. Therefor, in my opinion the injunction should be dissolved.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.-Tn Equity.
BENJAMIN

D. SANDERS

VS. JOHN T. LOGAN ET AL.

1. The circuit courts of the United States, having jurisdiction in equity of controversies arising under the United States Patent Laws, do not act as ancillary
to a court of law, and therefore do not require the patentee first to establish his
legal right in a court of law and by the verdict of a jury.
2. Where the injury done to a patentee by infringement of his patent is not in the
use of his invention, but in making use of it without compensating the patentee
therefor, it being the interest of the patentee that his invention should be used
and adopted by all, the measure of "actual damage" is the price or value of a

license to use it.
3. In such cases, the measure of damage being a certain sum, an account of profits
is not required, and the jurisdiction of a chancellor need not be invoked.
4. Injunction is not the proper remedy in such cases: it is a remedy used only for
prevention and protection, and not to enforce the payment of moncy, nor for
extortion.
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5. A court of law may treble a verdict for " actual damage" in a patent suit, where
the defendant has acted wantonly or vexatiously, but a court of equity can inflict
no exemplary or punitive damages as apourt of law may.
6. In Sanders' patent for improvement in winnowing machines, issued 19th June,
1849, reissued April 10, 1855, the claim in the original patent is a correct description of the whole invention. The third claim of the reissued patent is too broad.
The use of a vertical blast-spout, so arranged that grain is cleaned from impurities within said spout, was not new.
7. The use of several machines in public, for more than two years prior to applying
for a patent, although slightly varying in form and arrangement, yet substantially the same as afterwards patented, cannot be alleged to be experimental, so
as to avoid the legal consequences of such prior use.
8. The obvious construction of the seveiith sectionof the patent act of 1839 is that
a purchase, sale, or prior use, within two years before applying for a patent,
shall not invalidate, unless it amounts to an abandonment to the public.
9. Abandonment may take place -within the two years prior to the application for a
patent.

Bill filed by Benjamin D. Sanders against 'John T. Logan and
others, for infringement of- letters patent granted to complainant
for 'improvement in winnowing machines, issued the 19th June,
1849, reissued April 10, 1855, praying for injunction to restrain
the defendants from further use of said improvement, and for an
account, &c.
The respondents' answer alleges that the patent is void-first, for
want of novelty; second, by reason of publi6 use by patentee and
others for more than two years prior to the application for a patent;
third, by reason of abandonment prior to the application; fourth,
prior description of the alleged invention in public printed works;
fifth, that the patentee was not the inventor. The answer also
denies the infringement.
The nature of the invention and the claims are set forth in the
opinion of the court.
On the Pplea denying the infringement, the respondents showed
that in their machines the vertical blast-spout, in which the grain is
cleaned, is of the same dimensions throughout, and that the blastspout in their machines does not communicate -with the atmospheric
current through a screen; and, therefore, they claimed that they
did not use the combination set forth in the complainant's patent.
In proof that the subject-matter of the third claim of complain-
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ant's reissued patent was not new at the time of his alleged invention, they offer in evidence the following patents, viz :
Orrin Lull's smut machine, patented 6th April, 1843.
James Coppuck's grain-cleaning machine, patented 24th April,
1841.
Phillips & Jackson's winnowing machine, patented 4th May, 1841.
Joseph Johnson's smut machine, patented September 4, 1845.

Hon. B. Xf. Stanton and Jas. A. Lowrie, for complainant.
W. Bakewell and George Shiras, for respondents.
The opinion of the Court was delivered, May 13, 1861, by
GRIER, J.-The complainant alleges in his bill that he is the
original and first inventor and patentee of "a machine for winnowing and cleaning grain of chaff, smut, and other impurities." His
original patent was dated 19th of June, 1849. It was afterwards
surrendered and a new patent granted, with an amended specification, on the 10th of April, 1855. The bill prays for an injunction
and an account; and yet admitting the validity of the patent and
its infringement by respondents, it is clear that as a proper remedy
for the injury complained of, neither an injunction nor an account
are necessary or proper. The invention claimed is for an improvement in the machinery of grist mills, and the only injury to plaintiff's rights exists not in using his invention, for it is his interest
that all mills should adopt and use it, provided he is paid the price
of a license. Such price or value of a license is the true measure
of the "actual damage" suffered, and of the remedy which the
patentee can obtain, or has a right to claim in equity. A court of
law may treble such a verdict where the defendant has acted
wantonly or vexatiously. Where the measure of damage is a certain
sum, and does not require an account of profits, the peculiar jurisdiction of a chancellor is not needed for that purpose. The remedy
by injunction is neither necessary nor proper to enforce the payment of money. It is true that injunctions are now more liberally
granted than in former times, yet the granting or refusal of them
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. A rash or indiscreet
exercise of this power may be very oppressive, of no use to the
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complainant, and ruinous to the defendant. As a remedy it should
Where it is
be administered only for prevention or protection.
not necessary for these purposes it is merely vindictive, injuring
one party, without benefit to the other. There are many cases
of patents where it is the only efficient remedy to protect the
patentee and prevent continuing trespasses on his rights. But
there are others in which it answers neither purpose, and is only
used for extortion or vengeance. A chancellor who would issue
an injunction to stop a mill or manufactory, locomotive or steam
engine, because in their construction some patented device or
machine has been used, would act with more than doubtful discretion. Stopping the mill or steam engine might inflict irreparable
injury, but could not benefit the inventor. The compensation to
him for this trespass on his rights is the price of a license. The
wrong done him is not the use of his invention, but the non-payment
of a given sum of money. To issue an injunction in such a case,
where neither prevention -nor protection is sought or required, but
only compensation, would be an abuse of power. An injunction is
not to be used as an execution or for extortion.
The circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction of controversies arising under the patent laws by direct grant from Congress. They do not merely act as ancillary to a court of law, and
therefore do not require the patentee to establish his legal right
in a court of law and by the verdict of a jury. There has been no
objection interposed to the jurisdiction of the court in this case,
nor do I wish to be considered as deciding that the court has no
jurisdiction, but rather as suggesting to counsel whether they have
chosen the proper tribunal, when the bill exhibits a case where
neither account nor injunction are proper remedies, but only a
decree for a certain sum of money, with interest, as fixed actual
damage. A court of equity can inflict no exemplary or punitive
damages as a court of law may. Hence the party may have better
remedy in a suit at law.
The complainant's patent gives the following general description
of the nature of his invention : "The nature of my invention consists-first, in separating the chaff, smut, and other impurities from
grain, by subjecting the same to a blast within a vertical spout, as
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will be hereafter shown, whereby the sound grain, by its superior
gravity, is prevented from being carried upward by the blast or
current of air, and at the same time the impurities, which are light,
follow the current, and are drawn through the fan-box and discharged through the longitudinal trunk of the same, the light or
imperfect grain being carried upward and lodged within a hopper at
the lowest part of the horizontal trunk. Ay invention also consists
in the combination of vertical blast-spouts, screen, hopper, and fan,
arranged and operated, as will be hereafter shown and described."
The claim set forth in the original patent of 1849 is a correct
description of the whole invention. It is as follows :
"What I claim as my invention is the trunk F, gradually enlarged
from below upwards, and communicating with the atmospheric current through the screen H, in communication with the hopper E',
and the fan placed at the end of the opposite vertical trunk D, to
separate the chaff and other impurities from the grain, in the manner, substantially, as herein described."
The amended patent of 1855 describes the same invention, with
immaterial variations, or more minute directions as to size and
shape.
The chief difference is, that the claim of the last is made broader
than that of the original, whether better may be doubted. It is as
follows:
"1st. The employment or use of a vertical blast-spout F, gradually enlarged from its lower to its upper end, so that the strength
of the blast is decreased in the upper portion of the spout, owing to
the increased space or area of the spout, for the purpose of preventing any sound or perfect grain being carried with the light
foreign matter over the upper edge of the spout, the blast being
fanned or generated in said spout in any proper manner.
"2d. I claim the blast-spout F, either gradually enlarged from
below upwards, or of the same dimensions throughout, and communicating with the atmospheric current thtrough the screen H, in
combination with the hopper B', and the fan placed at the end of
the opposite vertical spout D, to separate the chaff and other impu-
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rities from the grain, in the manner, substantially, as herein
described.
13 d. I claim the employment or use of a vertical blast-spout,
either gradually enlarged from below upwards, or of the same
dimensions throughout, where said blast-spout is so arranged that
the grain is cleaned or separated from impurities within said vertical spout."
The answer of respondents alleges:
1. That complainant was not the original and first inventor of
the machine, or combination of devices, claimed as his invention.
2. But admitting him to be so, he had abandoned his invention
to the public prior to the application for a patent.
3. That the invention was in public use, with knowledge and consent of complainant, more than two years previous to his application
for a patent.
4. That the machine used by defendant does not infringe the
rights of complainant.
If any one of these allegations be established by the evidence,
the respondents are entitled to a decree.
I see no reason to doubt that the plaintiff is the original inventor
of the device in the first claim, and, also, of the combination claimed
in the second, notwithstanding the valuable suggestions and assistance rendered to him by his partner, Justus, in perfecting his
machine.
The third claim is too broad. The vertical spout had previously
been used, in the same way, in other machines invented and
patented for the purpose of cleaning grain from its impurities. It
is to be found in Lull's smut machine, patented in 1843, and in
some others.
Sanders made his first machine in 1844. It embodied the ideas
of his subsequent patent as to the combination of devices to be used,
though differing somewhat in arrangement and form.
ie had put
it into operation in Hugh Ryland's mill in Virginia. Afterwards, in
September, 1855, when he was in the employment of Justus, with
whom he had first learned his trade of millwright, and assisting
him in his erecting the machinery of Davis' mill, he informed him
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of the machine he had put in operation in Virginia. Justus seized
upon the ideas suggested by Sanders, made plans and a model,
improving upon them, and erected the machine, substantially as it
was afterwards patented, in Davis' mill. This was in December,
1845. In July, 1846, Justus erected one of these machines for
Crawford. In September, Justus and Sanders entered into partnership as millwrights. Sanders suggested that they should take out
a joint patent for the invention. Justus said he thought it did not
deserve a patent; there was too little to be patented. They then
proceeded to put these machines in every mill which they were
employed to erect during their partnership, which was dissolved in
1848. They considered the machine as' completed by their joint
invention, and freely gave it to the public till November 80, 1848,
when Sanders entered his claim for a patent.
It is clear, therefore, that assuming that Sanders was the sole
inventor of the machine, as perfected in 1845, with Justus' assistance, yet that he was not entitled to a patent for the same. The
evidence established a clear case of abandonment, and, moreover,
that the invention was publicly used, with the knowledge, consent,
and approbation of the complainant more than two years previous
to his application for a patent. The allegation that these machines
were made and incorporated into so many mills all. over the country
for the purposes of experiment is too absurd to be entertained for
a moment.
By the patent act of 1836, a use of an invention by a single person,
or a sale of the thing invented to a single person, might amount to
such a public use, without consent and allowance of the patentee,
as would forfeit his right to a patent.
The seventh section of the act of 1839 provided a remedy for
cases where the conduct of the party did not show an actual abandonment. It secures the rights of those who may have purchased
or constructed any newly-invented machine prior to the application
for a patent. It provides that "no patent shall be held to be
invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use, prior to the application for a patent, except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public; or that such purchase, sale, or prior use has
31
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been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent."
The obvious construction of this section of the act is, that a purchase, sale, or prior use shall not invalidate, unless it amounts to
an abandonment to the public. Although I am of opinion that the
evidence exhibits a clear case of abadlonment, as distinguisliedl
from the " purchase, sale, or prior use," which is tolerated for two
years, it is not necessary to rest our decision on that point alone,
or to attempt to draw a line of distinction which might be applicable to other cases. The prior use has been proved to have existed
more than two years before application for a patent.
As I think the respondents have supported this plea they are
entitled to a decree : I need not, therefore, enlarge upon the plea
denying the infringement, further than to say, I think the respondents would have been entitled to a decree in their favor on that
point also.
The bill must be dismissed, with costs.

ln tLe Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE PIIILADELPHIA ASSOCIATION FOR THE RELIEF OF DISABLED
FIREMEN IS,. GEORGE WOOD,
WHO WAS SCED WiTu JAMES H.

1

O.TGOMERY AND JOSHUA A. ASK!.

The act of Assembly of May 7, 1857, imposing on the agencies of foreign insurance
companies in the city of Philadelphia the duty of paying two per cent. on all
their receipts to the Philadelphia Association for the Relief of Disabled Firemen,
is so extraordinary in its character, of such very doubtful constitutional validity,
so dangerous in its tendency as a precedent, and so unusual in respect to the
form prescribed for the enforcement of its terms, that the judiciary will net
enforce the bonds given by such agencies, for the payment of the said per ceutum
on their premiums, to the said Association.

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia County.
The following facts were agreed upon, as a case stated for the
opinion of the Court, with leave to turn the same into a special
verdict.
The plaintiffs are an incorporation, created by act of Assembly
1 We are indebted to the Legal Intelligencer for this report of the case.
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of this State of 25th March, 1835, (P. L., p. 85, prout the same,)
for the purpose of relieving disabled firemen, their widows and
orphans, and persons sustaining injury by fire apparatus.
By act of 9th April, 1856, (P. L., p. 284,) entitled "An Act
relative to Agencies of Foreign Insurance, Trust and Annuity
Companies," insurance companies incorporated by other States or
foreign governments, desiring to transact business in this State, are
entitled to do so upon depositing with the Auditor-General certain
statements of their condition, and complying with certain other
conditions, and paying for transacting business in the city of Philadelphia the sum of two hundred dollars: upon doing which a
license shall be granted to them for carrying on such business for
the period of one year from the date of granting such license.
The Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool is an association of
individuals, not incorporated by the laws of this State, doing business as a fire insurance company in the city of Philadelphia, having
an agency established in said city, the defendant, George Wood,
being their agent.
On the 28th January, 1857, the said The Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool, having in other respects complied with the
provisions of the act of the 9th April, 1856, paid to the Treasurer
of this State, for the use of the Commonwealth, the sum of two
hundred dollars, as required by the said act, and received, in
accordance with its provisions, from the Auditor-General, a license
(prout the same) to carry on their said business by their agent, the
said defendant, for the period of one year from the date of the
granting of such license.
By an act of Assembly, passed the 7th May, 1857, relative to
agencies of foreign insurance and trust and annuity companies in
the city of Philadelphia, (P. L., p. 423, prout the same,) it is
enacted, among other things, that there shall be paid to the treasurer of the Philadelphia Association for the Relief of Disabled
Firemen, for the use of said Association, on the 1st day of February
in each year, by every person who shall act, in the city of Philadelphia, as agent of any association of individuals, not incorporated
by the laws of this State, to effect insurances against loss by fire
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in the city of Philadelphia, the sum of two dollars upon the one
hundred dollars, and at that rate upon the amount of all premiums
which, during the year or part of a year, ending the next preceding
1st day of September, shall have been received by such agent, or
by any person for him, for any insurance effected, or agreed to be,
against loss or injury by fire, in the city and county of Philadelphia; and every such agent shall execute and deliver to the said
treasurer a bond to the Philadelphia Association for the Relief of
Disabled Firemen, in the penal sum of one thousand dollars, with
sureties, conditioned, inter alia, that he will annually, on the 1st
day of February, in each year, pay to said treasurer two dollars
upon every hundred, and at that rate upon the amount of any premiums so received; and all previous laws inconsistent with the said
act were thereby repealed.
On the 12th May, 1857, a supplement to the act of 9th April,
1856, (P. L., p. 458, prout the same,) was passed, embracing within
its provisions all foreign associations, companies, and individuals,
formed or established for insuring fire, marine, or life risks, &c.,
whether established on the stock or mutual principle, and dispensing
with certain previous formal requirements.
On the 10th of July, 1857, the defendant, George Wood, agent
of the Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool, with the defendants,
James H. Montgomery and Joshua P. Ash, executed and delivered
a bond to the plaintiffs, in the sum of one thousand dollars, (prout
the same,) reciting the act of Assembly before mentioned, of 7th
May, 1857; and conditioned that if the said Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool and the said George Wood, their agent, should
truly perform every thing for securing performance whereof bond
was by the said act required to be given, and of which performance
might lawfully be required or requirable under said act, then the
said obligation should be void, or else remain in full force.
On the 28th January, 1858, the said Royal Insurance Company
of Liverpool, having previously applied in writing, and in other
respects complied with the provisions of the act of 9th April, 1856,
paid to the treasurer of this State, for the use of the Commonwealth, the further sum of two hundred dollars, as thereby required
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and received, in accordance with its provisions, from the AuditorGeneral, a license (prout the same) to carry on their said business,
by their said agent, for the period of one year from the date of
granting of such license.
On the 28th January, 1859, the said The Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool, having in other respects complied with the provisions of the act of 9th April, 1856, paid to the treasurer of this
State, for the use of the Commonwealth, the further sum of two
hundred dollars, as thereby required, and received, in accordance
with its provisions, from the Auditor-General, a license (prout the
same) to carry on their said business by their said agent, for the
period of one year from the date of granting such license.
No per centage upon the amount of premiums so received by the
said Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool, and no part or sum
of said moneys so received as premiums, respectively, has ever been
paid by the said George Wood, agent, or by any other person on
behalf of the said The Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool, to
the plaintiffs, or to their treasurer, or any person on their behalf.
Suit was commenced by the said plaintiffs against the defendant,
George Wood, and the said Ash and Montgomery, of whom only
the said Wood was served with process, in which the plaintiffs
declared upon the said bond (prout narr.) to recover the penalty
thereof.
If, upon the whole case, the Court shall be of opinion that the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover, then judgment is to be entered in
their favor against the said George Wood, in the sum of one thousand dollars, with costs; but if the Court shall be of opinion that
the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, then judgment is to be
entered in favor of the defendant, George Wood, with costs.
Judgment by Court below for plaintiff for $1,000.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LowRIE, C. J.-In April, 1856, the Legislature regulated the
terms on which agencies of insurance companies, incorporated by
other States or foreign governments, might transact their business
within this State, and imposed an annual license fee of $200 on
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such as should be established in Philadelphia. In January, 1857;
the Royal Insurance Company of Liverpool conformed to the termg
of the law, paid the license fee, and commenced business there.
In May, 1857, a law was passed, imposing on all such agencies in
Philadelphia the duty of paying two per cent. on all their receipts to
the Philadelphia Association for the Relief of Disabled Firemen, and
requiring the payment thereof to be secured by bond, with a special
and appropriate condition, and with proper sureties. In July, 1857,
the defendant, as agent of the Royal Insurance Company, gave a
bond, with sureties, not exactly with the condition required by the
law, but generally for the performance of every thing required of
him by the Relief Association under the law. He is now sued on
this bond, his sureties not being served with process, and defends
on the ground that the law is ineffectual and unconstitutional, as
a means of imposing this duty upon him, and that the bond is void;
We notice that the Legislature does not call this burden upon
the agencies of foreign insurance companies a tax, and ve think it
cannot properly be so called. Nor is it called a condition on which
such agencies are to be allowed, and it is not a condition, for it is
totally independent of the license, and by a different act of Assembly; the license is complete without the law imposing this burden.
It is simply the creation of a relation or duty that had before no
existence, and not the regulation of an existing one.
Such legislation is manifestly very extraordinary, and it is well
to study all its peculiarities, in order that we may the better estimate its soundness.
It is a burden imposed upon agents of companies not incorporated by our State. It is, therefore, intended to distinguish between
our own corporations and those of other people, so as to impose
heavier burdens on the latter than on the former. So far as this
relates to corporations created by our sister States, it has often
been doubted by our most eminent jurists and statesmen whether
this is not forbidden by the nature and spirit of our Federal
Union, and by the Federal Constitution, which declares that "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States." We do not under-
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take to decide this question now, but to show how doubtful is the
constitutionality of such distinctions, we refer to many able opinions
on the question published in connection with the cases of the Fire
Department of New York vs. Yoble &f Wright, 3 E. D. Smith's
Rep. 440, 453.
Such legislation seems hardly consistent with the usual comity or
political generosity which we exercise in our relations with the
citizens of sister States, or even with those of stranger States.
We allow aliens, even those who have no intention to take a permanent residence here, to carry on among us every sort of lawful
business on the same terms as our own citizens. This would seem
to he a necessary result of that fraternal generosity which each
State of the Uuion owes to every other State. No one ought to
insist on that Utopian and impracticable cosmopolitism that would,
in all cases, put the citizens of foreign States on an entire equality
with our brethreii.
All will admit that our government ought to regulate the terms
on which insurance companies of sister States may do business
here, because this may be necessary for the security of our citizens
dealing with them. And it is quite as clear that these companies
ought to be taxed on their business here for the support of the publie burdens.
We admit, also, that the protection against unequal treatment in
taxation, which is afforded by the principal of international or
interstate comity, is no exclusion of ungenerous legislation, but
only a motive for abstinence from it. That motive ought to be
much more powerful against legislation like this, which contains not
a mere interstate distinction, but a distinction within the State: for
it imposes burdens upon agents doing business in Philadelphia, and
not upon those doing the same business in other parts of the State,
and upon one class of business without any like burden upon any
other class. Yet, if this is taxation, we do not see bow we can
pronounce it unconstitutional, merely on the ground of inequality,
for this is unavoidable; approximate equality is all that is to be
expected, and classification is unavoidable, for different subjects of
taxation must be reached in different forms. But it becomes very
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dangerous to the principle of equality, and may become very tyrannical, when very small classes, which enjoy but little of the support
of public sympathy, are selected out as special subjects of taxation.
The objection to this kind of legislation is much more serious,
that the act of 1857 simply and arbitrarily imposes upon the agents
of foreign insurance companies the duty of paying two per cent. of
the premiums received by them to a private corporation in Philadelphia.
Of course there was a good motive for this. The relief of disabled firemen is a purpose worthy of a society. And firemen contribute much to save insurance companies from losses. And hence
it is inferred that insurance companies ought to contribute to the
support of those who have been disabled in working for their
benefit. But the same argument might be quite as effectually used
as a reason for imposing a burden in favor of this society, upon
those who obtain insurances, and much more so upon those who
do not insure at all. Therefore, since the chief characteristic of
justice is its equality, the justice of this provision is very far from
being apparent. An untrained and unthoughtful benevolence is
very apt to be unjust to those interests which do not attract its
special attention.
This is an association for charitable purposes, it is true, but still
it is strictly a private corporation. No public officer has any official knowledge of its existence, or of its members, organization, or
acts. It renders no account of its proceedings or of its funds. It
is a close corporation, fixing its own terms of membership, and
changing its organization, but not its object, as itpleases. The
imposition upon the defendant below, or on his principals, of the
duty of contributing to its support, is, therefore, simply taking one
man's property and giving it to another. It is depriving a man of
his property without due process of law, even when it is sought to
be done through the instrumentality of the courts, for the Legislature cannot require one man to give his money to another, and then
give him an action to enforce their will, and expect this to be
treated as a remedy by due course of law.
If the Legislature may command such a contribution as this, we
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are unable to see why they may not command every citizen to contribute not only to this association, but to every charitable association, and, indeed, to every man who spends his time and means in
a charitable way. There are associations for all sorts of charity;
why may not the Legislature require us all to contribute to them
all, if they may require this class of people to contribute to this
one? We cannot answer this question.
We have said this is not a tax. It does not profess to be. It
has none of the forms of taxation in the mode of its collection.
And if it were called a tax, it could not be one, for a name arbitrarily given cannot change its nature. A tax is an imposition for
the supply of the public treasury, and not for the supply of individuals or private corporations, however benevolent they may be.
It is the legislative power that is vested in the Legislature, and
of course this includes tax legislation; and this meafis the making
of laws that are to furnish the measure of every man's duty in
support of the public burdens, and the means of enforcing it. Certainly it is not plain that, in either form or substance, this is tax
legislation. If it is a mere requisition that one class of men shall
pay their money to another class, it is no legislation at all.
The old monopolies, which played so important a part under
some English monarchs, and in the development of English liberty,
were professedly grants to meritorious public servants, (though often
they were only favorites,) of the exclusive right to trade in or to
import certain kinds of merchandise; and this, of course, gave
them the profits of such trade, and a large control over every one
who needed the given class of articles. Of course it was said that,
if people desired to prevent such profits, they could abstain from
the use of the articles; as it is said here, if these agencies will not
bear the imposition, they can abandon the business. But this
answer was not satisfactory then, and cannot be now, for the simple
reason that in neither case is it for the support of the public burdens, but for private account.
If great public service, or great expectation of public service,
charitable or otherwise, is to be the ground for justifying such
grants, we know not why they should not be much more liberal
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towards firemen than this: for they are continually rendering good
service to the people. It is, perhaps, a little more important to
know and to notice that they are a body of great influence, and
are thus likely to be favorites of those in power, and to have the
rights of others overlooked when it is important to please them.
They may come to think hereafter, if this grant be admitted to be
reasonable, that it is quite as reasonable that they should have a
grant of two or of twenty per cent. of the rents of all the houses
in the vicinity of their respective engine houses, on account of the
protection they give them. Now-a-days, when it has come to be
considered that the ancient and valued right of petition is fast
giving away to the influence of paid borers and of private solicitation, when the public voice is so little heard in legislative halls, and
so seldom expressed in legislation, and when legislative time and
talents are invoked much more for special schemes, and by the private calendar, than for measures of general welfare, it becomes
very important to watch such grants as this. There are very many
such bodies as the firemen, which, if they choose to exert their
influence, will find themselves able to control their immediate representatives, even to the detriment of the public interests, and against
any supposable public will.
We have said that this imposition is not a condition of a grant
to the agencies of the right to engage in the insurance business.
They needed no such grant. There is a prohibition until certain
terms are complied with, and then the license is granted. This
imposition is entirely independent of all that, and has nothing in
its form or nature that likens it to a condition either precedent or
subsequent. It is simply a decree that one class of men shall pay
to others a share of the profits of their business.
True, the Legislature might have imposed an equivalent tax on
the business, and, when paid into the public treasury, might have
appropriated it to this association. But would the Legislature
make such an appropriation of public funds ? In this case, it is
quite apparent that the form of the proceeding belongs to the very
essence of the provision made for the public safety. The imposition on this agency amounts now, at two per cent., to $1,500 a
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year, and ten such agencies would give the Association 815,000 a
year. It is certain it could have got nothing like this in the annual
appropriation bill. We are quite sure that no such bounty was
intended when the law was passed, for the bond to be given to
secure the payment, and which may be the only security for many
years, is in the penal sum of only $1,000.
And, finally, if this imposition may be proplrly called a tax,
then we seriously'deny the authority of the Legislature to impose
upon the courts the duties of the tax collectors, and especially so
when the tax is for private account, and not for the public treasury.
When they do so, this court or any other may reject the function,
whether it comes up by action merely on the duty imposed, or on
a bond given to secure the duty. The courts are not to be tax
collectors in any form, except as a consequence of some dispute
arising in the process of collection, where judicial intervention
becomes necessary, or as a means of enforcing official duty, or
where the ordinary means of collection have failed. Even if the
ordinary municipal liens for paving, &c., are taxes, the courts have
nothing to do with them, though entered on their records, except to
oversee the enforcemenit of the lien, if any dispute arise.
Considering, then, that this imposition is so extraordinary in its
character, of such very doubtful constitutional validity, so dangerous in its tendency as a precedent, and so unusual in the form of
its enforcement, we must most respectfully decline, for the judiciary
department of the government, the enforcement of the bond given
to secure its payment.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendant below, with
costs, and record remitted.

